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ABSTRACT 
Agricult~iral  sales cooperative  ~lnions  (ASCUs) in  Tut-key are heavily  influenced  by  both 
domestic  and  international government policies.  Both  export taxes and  import tariffs are 
used  as policy tools to reg~llate  cotton  markets.  Domestic  price support programs, water 
subsidies. fertilizer subsidies. and credit subsidies have also been used as domestic policy 
tools. Tliese types of subsidies are not ~~ncommon  among developing countries. This paper 
provides empirical estimates of  the degree of economic inefficiency associated  with  gov- 
ernment  intervention  in  Turkish cotton  ~narkets.  A two-region  partial  ecluilibriurn model 
of cotton exports and imports is developed undel- the "small  country assumption"  to obtain 
empirical estimates of the deadweight welfare loss associated  with these government sub- 
sidies. Altllouph  government intervention results in  significant income distribution among 
the various cotton sectors within Turkey. the overall economic inefficiency  of the redistri- 
bution  is very low. 
State Trading Enterprises (STEs) are prevalent 
in  many  parts  of  the  world  (Ackerman and 
Dixit.  1999:  Schmitz,  Furtan,  and  Baylis, 
1999). They are under close  scrutiny by  the 
WTO, and many questions surround their ac- 
tivities. For example, what practices '111  with- 
in  the  legal  definition  of  state  trading  and 
STEs? Does the WTO allow trade-distorting 
activities that cause world prices and quanti- 
ties to differ from those present in  a perfectly 
competitive market? Does the WTO  define its 
criteria  governing  STEs  clearly?  Does  the 
WTO  differentiate  between STE trade distor- 
tions caused by hard-price  discrimination 
(charging  different  buyers  different  prices 
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without  using  government subsidies) versus 
those caused by soft price discrimination (us- 
ing direct government subsidies)? And finally, 
do  STE activities significantly distort trade? 
Turkey is a country where STEs are wide- 
spread,  and  export  taxes  and  subsidies  are 
used extensively. Also. it has been alleged that 
rent-seeking activities, thl-o~~gh  STEs. contrib- 
ute to significant inefficiencies in resource al- 
location  (Kruege~; 1974).  In  Turkey,  border 
measures for cotton, such as export taxes and 
import tariffs, are announced by government 
decree each year.  Support (floor) prices have 
also been traditionally  announced by decree, 
but rarely  at the sarne time as corresponding 
border measures. Ag1-icultural Sales Coopera- 
tives Unions (ASCUs), which are STEs, act as 
agencies for the procurement and sale of cot- 
ton. Government intcrver~tion  in Turkish  ag- 82  Jourrltrl  ~~f'AgrI~~uIt~1r~11  and Applied   economic,^. April 2002 
riculture  is  also  present  in  that  government 
provides additional subsidies for the conimod- 
ities handled by  the ASCUs. Subsidies are ap- 
plied  to  water, fertilizer,  and  credit. Agricul- 
tural  cooperatives that  administer these types 
of  subsidies, as well  as  government policies 
that  combine export taxes.  import tariffs and 
price supports, are not uncommon among oth- 
er developing countries. 
ASCUs are commissioned to buy commod- 
ities  at  the  determined  price  supports and  to 
implement  most  other domestic subsidy pro- 
grams. The ASCUs are then reimbursed by the 
Treasury for any loss related to the difference 
between  the support price and the sales price. 
The  implications  of  agricultural  price  inter- 
vention  and  possible agricult~~ral  trade policy 
reform  in  Turkey  have been  discussed by  01- 
gun  (1989).  Harrison.  Rutherford,  and  Tarr 
(I  993); and Gurkan and  Kasnakoglu  ( 199  1 ). 
Subsidies on water, fertili~er,  and credit, in 
combination with export taxes, import tariffs, 
and  domestic price  supports, result in  rnarket 
distortions  that  directly  affect the  magnitude 
and distribution of  welfare among producers. 
consumers, ancl  taxpayers  in the Turkish  cot- 
ton  sector. The potential  gains that  can be re- 
alized from the liberalization of both domestic 
and international farm policies are well known 
(Schmitz, Sigurdson. and  Doering,  1986: and 
Schmitz, Schmitz  and  Dumas,  1997). How- 
ever, these papers do not consider the case of 
a market affected by both export taxes and im- 
port tariffs. 
Hudson and Etheridge (2000) measure the 
income distributional impacts of trade policies 
in  the case of cotton production and process- 
ing in Pakistan. Their analysis contains a mul- 
ti-market  equilibrium model  that  includes be- 
havioral  relationships  for  producers  and 
processors of cotton. They tind that income is 
transferred from cotton producers to yarn spin- 
ners and taxpayers as a direct result of export 
taxes imposed by  the government. They also 
discuss the common practice  among develop- 
ing countries of "controlling the price of a raw 
material  3s ;I  means of  conferring a competi- 
tive  advantage  on  their  domestic industries" 
(Hudson and Etheridge, 2000, p.  1).  However, 
cotton markets in TLII-key  should be treated dif- 
ferently  than  cotton  markets  in  Pakistan. 
While the approach taken by Hudson and Eth- 
eridge (2000) is quite appropriate for Pakistan, 
it cannot be applied to Turkey. The multi-mar- 
ket  equilibrium  model  developed  by  Hudson 
and  Etheridge  (2000) contains  export  taxes 
and  price  supports  for producers  and  down- 
stream  processors  in  Pakistan.  treating  raw 
cotton  as  a  homogeneo~~s  commodity. How- 
ever.  in  the case of  Turkey. cotton  should be 
treated  as a non-homogenous commodity be- 
cause cotton produced on the Aegean coast is 
very  different  from  non-Aegean  cotton 
(Schmitz, Cakmak. Schmit~.  and Gray, 1999). 
While export taxes are placed on Aegean cot- 
ton  exported  by  Turkey  (;IS  is  the  case with 
Pakistan),  import  tariffs  are  also  placed  on 
non-Aegean  cotton  imported  by  Turkey. 
Hence,  the  multi-market  model  presented 
herein  is  horizontal,  while  Hudson  and  Eth- 
eridge (2000) employ a vertical analysis. 
The major objective of this paper is to mea- 
sure the  degree of  economic  inefficiency  as- 
sociatecl with government intervention in cot- 
ton  markets  in  Turkey. A  two-region, partial 
eq~~ilibrium  model  of  cotton exports and  im- 
ports  is  developed  to  obtain  empirical  esti- 
mates of  the  deadweight welfare loss associ- 
ated  with  the combination  of  domestic price 
support progratns, import duties. export taxes. 
water subsidies, fertilizer subsidies, and credit 
subsidies provided by the Turkish government. 
Descriptions  of  the  Turkish  cotton  industry 
and  the  implications  of  TARIS  (the largest 
ASCU invol\;eci in cotton) are provided in  Ap- 
pendices I and 11 in order to motivate the anal- 
ysis  and  to justify  the  separation  of  Turkish 
cotton markets into distinct export and import 
markets. 
Measuring the Efficiency of Turkish 
Cotton Markets 
The degree of  economic  inefficiency  ascoci- 
ated with government cotton policy in  TLII-key 
is meawred by  con4tructing one partial  eclui- 
librium  model for the Aegean market and one 
for  the  non-Aegean  market.  Consumer.  pro- 
ducer. and government  well'rire ~~nder  the cur- 
rent  policy  regime  are  compareci  with  free SL  hmrt:  Meu\l/rtr~g  Ir~c,fic  lent \  X 3 
AEGEAN  MARKET  NON-AEGEAN MARKET 
P  P 
Figures 1 and 2.  Aegean and non-Aegean  cotton markets 
trade in each market. Government intervention 
in  Turkish  cotton markets results in a  net  in- 
come  transfer  from  taxpayers  to  producers. 
Because this transfer is  implemented through 
various  international and domestic policies, a 
portion  of  the  amount paid  by  taxpayers  to 
support Turkish  cotton  producers is never re- 
alized by producers. Domestic cotton consum- 
ers (it.. further processors)  are also affectecl 
by  these  government  policies.  The resulting 
econoniic inefficiencies attributed to the above 
forms  of  government  intervention  are  mea- 
sured by  aggregating the loss in economic ef- 
ficiency  from  both  the  Aegean  anci  non-Ae- 
gean  cotton  markets  following  the  generally 
accepted  principles of  welfare analysis taken 
from Just. Hueth. and Sch~nit~  ( 1982). 
Consider the  Aegean  market  as illustrated in 
Figure  1. The Turkish do~nestic  demand curve 
for Aegean cotton is given by  D and the sup- 
ply  curve for Turkish Aegean cotton is given 
by  S. The shut-down price  (i.e.. the  price  at 
which  producers  just  cover  average variable 
costs  ancl  below  which  producers  would 
switch to some other crop) is  represented  by 
P,.  P,.  is  the  world  price  for Aegean  cotton. 
For purposes of this analysis we employ the 
"small  country"  :issumption; that is, the world 
price for cotton is not affected by the quantity 
exported  by  Turkey.  Egyptian  cotton  is  the 
only clohe substitute for Turkish Ae,  uean  cot- 
ton. Hence. it is possible that Turkey may have 
a  certain  degree  of  monopoly  power  in  the 
world  market  for  Aegean  cotton.  However, 
testing for market power is beyond the scope 
of this analysis. From  1995 through  1997. the 
average  volume  of  Aegean  cotton  exports 
from Turkey  was only 40.000  metric tonnes. 
which  is a small portion of total world cotton 
exports. 
The quantity  of  Aegean  cotton clernanded 
by  Turkish consumers in free trade (assuming 
no trade barriers or input subsidies) would be 
QP;.  The quantity  of Aegean  cotton produced 
by Turkey under free trade would be QG  and 
the quantity  exported under free trade would 
be (QF - Q:;)  In free trade, consumer surplus 
would  equal area P,ab and producer surplus 
would equal area P,.cP,.  Total ccono~nic  wel- fare under free trade. which is derived by add- 
ing consumer and producer surplus together, is 
the  benchmark  of  economic  efficiency  by 
which any other market structure can be mea- 
sured (Figure l). 
To  illustrate the efficiency  of  the  Aegean 
cotton market. consider S ' and P,, in Figure 1. 
P,, is the actual domestic price of Aegean cot- 
ton  in  Turkey,  which  is  determined  by  sub- 
tracting the export tax (imposed by the Turkish 
government  in  most  years), fro111 the  world 
price (P,.).  S' is the subsidized supply curve, 
which represents the outward shift of the ac- 
tual  s~~pply  curve (S) due to the water, fertil- 
izer. and credit subsidies provided by the Turk- 
ish  government  to cotton  producers  in  the 
Aegeari region. At a price of PI,, Turkish con- 
sumption of Aegean cotton is Q:,.  Turkish pro- 
duction of  Aegean  cotton is  Q:,  and Turkey 
exports a quantity of (Q:  - QA).  Figure  I  is 
drawn  such that  the quantity  supplied under 
the current marketing system is less than what 
would  be  produced  under free trade.'  Tn  this 
case, producer surplus equals area P,,fg. Coti- 
sumer surplus equals area  P,db.  The Turkish 
government collects export tax  revenue equal 
to area i.jfd. but Turkish taxpayers must pay an 
amount equal to area P,efg  to support Aegean 
cotton producers. 
Compared with free trade. consumers gain 
area  P,adP,,  in  consumer surplus under  the 
current  Aegean  marketing  systeni.  Producers 
galn area P,hfg,  but lose area P,chP,,  in terms 
of  producer  surplus.  The net  change in  pro- 
ducer surplus can be positive or negative. As 
the level of inp~~t  subsidies gets smaller or the 
export tax  gets larger, area P,chP,  will even- 
tually outweigh area P,hfg,  and producers will 
lose under the current Aegean  marketing sys- 
tem. Adding export tax revenue and subtract- 
ing  input  subsidies provided  by  the  govern- 
'  It  is  theorctically  possible  that  the q~lantity  pro- 
duced ~intlcr  the current n~:lrkcting  hystem could actu- 
ally he larger than the quantity that would be produced 
under  free  trade. This  uouid occur  if  the  cornhincd 
level  of.  input  subsidit..;  wa\  much  largcr  than  the 
amount of the export tax. In this case there would nl\o 
he  a  source  of  inefficiency  resulting  from  the  input 
subsidies. ~llthough  it uo~~ld  look different than in Fig- 
ure  1. 
merit.  the  net  inefficiency  of  the  Turkish 
Aegean  cotton  marketing  system  is equal  to 
area (aid  + jce). The magnitude of this  inef- 
ficiency is small relative to total producer rev- 
enue (Figure  I  ). 
No&  conslder  the  non-Aegean  market  11- 
lustrated  In  Figure  3. The Turkish  domestic 
demand curve for non-Aegean cotton is g'  riven 
by  D  and the  supply curve for Turk15h non- 
Aegean  cotton  is given by  S. The shut-down 
price  is  represented  by  P,.  P,  is  the  worlcl 
price  for  non-Aegean  cotton.  We  make  the 
"small  country"  assertion  for  non-Aegean 
cotton as well.  This seems reasonable  given 
that from 1995 through  1997 Turkey imported 
an  average of only  114,000 metric tonnes of 
cotton. This represents a very small portion of 
total nun-Aegean cotton exports relative to the 
rest of the world. 
Under free trade (with no input subsidies), 
the cl~~antity  demanded by  Turkish  consumers 
would be Qr,. The quantity  of Aegean  cotton 
produced by  Turkey under free trade would be 
Q:  and the quantity  imported under free trade 
would be (QL - (2;).  In free trade, consumer 
surplus would  equal area P,ab  and producer 
surplus would equal area PwcPs. Total surplus 
under free trade in the non-Aegean market is 
equal to area (P,ab  + P,,.cPs). 
To  illustrate the efficiency of the non-Ae- 
gean cotton market. consider S'  and P,, in Fig- 
ure 2. P,~,  is the actual domestic price of non- 
Aegean cotton in Turkey, which is determined 
by  adding  the  impc~rt  tariff  (imposed by  thc 
Turkish  government  in  most  years)  to  the 
world  price  (P,  ). S' is the subsidized s~~pply 
curve for non-Aegean cotton.'  At  a  price  of 
P,,, Turkish consutnption of no11-Aegean cot- 
ton  is  Q:,,  Turkish production  of non-Aegean 
cotton is Q:.  and Turkey imports a quantity of 
(Q:  - Q:).  Consumer  surplus  cquals  area 
P,db  and pi-oducel- .;urplus equals area P,,fg. 
The Turkish government collects revenue from 
import duties equal  to  area fdji, but  Turkish 
'This  curve is not the same as S'  in  Figurc  I  be- 
cause average ~nriable  costs. watcr costs. and Ucl-tilizrr 
costs  are different  in  the  non-Acgean  region  than  in 
the Aegean rcgion. taxpayers rnust  pay  an  amount equal  to area 
P,efg  to support non-Aegean cotton producers. 
Compi~red  with  free trade, consumers lose 
area  P,+adP,, in consumer  surplus  under the 
current  non-Aegean  marketing  system.  Pro- 
ducers gain  area P,,fgP,cP,.  which is always 
positive. Adding the revenue from the import 
duties and subtracting the input subsidies pro- 
vided by  the government. the net inefficiency 
of  the Turkish  non-Aegean  cotton  marketing 
system is equal to area (cei + jad). 
To  summarize, the inefficiency of the Turk- 
ish  cotton  marketing  system  can  be divided 
into two parts: the inefficiency  in the Aegean 
(export)  market  and  the  inefticiency  in  the 
non-Aegean (import) market. The inefticiency 
in the  Aegean  market equals area (aid + cej) 
(Figure I ). The inefficiency in the non-Aegean 
market  equals  area  (cei  +  jud)  (Figure  2). 
Hence.  the  inefticiency  of  the  entire  cotton 
marketing  systenl  in Turkey  is  equal  to  the 
values  represented  by  the  sum of  these  four 
areas.' 
Empirical  estimates of the efticiency of Turk- 
ish cotton  markets are calculaled using a pro- 
cedure  adapted  from  Schmitz.  Schmitz, and 
Dumas ( 1997). De~nand  curves in each market 
are of the form 
Supply  curves  in  each  market  take  the 
form: 
(2)  P(Q) = b,, + b,Qh' 
These  equations  are  fit  through  points 
(P,,,Q:,)  and  (P,.QT)  in  Figure  1  and  points 
(P,,,QL) and (P,,QZ) in  Figure 2. Demand pa- 
' Imlxvt duties  andlor  export  taxe\  have  been  in 
place  only  in  certain  year\.  In  those  year\  in  which 
either of  thcx policies did not exist.  the level  ol' in- 
efticiency  i\  srnallcr.  but  is  still  po\itive  cl~ic.  to  the 
input  sub\idies.  The  aho\c analysis  still  applies  in 
thew cases because one can assume that the export tax 
and/o~-  imlx~rt  tarifl' \imply approaches /em. 
rameters  al-e  recovered  by  specifying  a  de- 
mand ela\ticity  (E,)  and using the fact that 
dlnQ  1 
-  (3)  t,,  = -  - - 
d  In  P  (1, 
Hence, the demand parameter (a,)  is found 
through the relationchip 
1 
(4  ti, =- 
Ell 
Once a, is determined, the second demand 
parameter (a,,) can be recovered u\ing 
(5)  a,, = PI,Q1' "' 
Recovery  of  supply  parameters  can  be  ac- 
complished by  spec~fying  a supply elasticity (E,', 
and \hutdown price (b,,) and rewriting  (2) a\ 
Taking the natural  logarithm of both  sides 
and solving for InQ yields 
Making  use  of  equation  (7), the  supply 
elasticity beco~nes 
Solving for the supply parameter bz: 
The tinal parameter can be recovered using 
(2)  and (9): 
Welfare measures can be derived wing the 
following procedure. By definition, consumer 
surplus represents the area below the dernand 
curve and bounded  by  the price line. Mathe- 
matically  this is writrcn: 86  Journal  c!j'A,griculturul (2nd Applied E(~orrorlzic,s,  Apr.i/ 2002 
where TR is total  revenue. Q,,  is the quantity 
demanded, and 8 is a number close to zero." 
Solving and rearranging (I I) yields 
where  PI, and  Q,,  are  the  price  and  quantity 
consumed, respective1  y. 
By  definition, producer  surplus represents 
the area below the price line and bounded by 
the supply curve. Mathematically, this is writ- 
ten as 
where  Q,  is  the  quantity  supplied.  Solving 
( 13) and rearranging yields 
( 14)  PS  = (P, - D,,)Q, - b,(b,  +  1 )'Qt2  I 
Model P~rrcinzeterizatiot~ 
The demand elasticity  used  for both  the  Ae- 
gean and non-Aegean Turkish cotton markets 
is  -0.3.  This is  taken  directly  from Gurkan 
and  Kasnakoglu (1991) and  is also consistent 
with  demand  elasticities  estimated  by  Duffy 
and Wohlgenant  (1 99  1 ) and used  in  Schmitz. 
Schmit~.  and  Dumas  (1997) for  the  United 
States. The supply  elasticity  is 0.4.  which  is 
rounded  from  Gurkan  and  Kasnakoglu's 
(1 99  1 ) estimate of 0.38. 
In order  to  take  input  subsidies  into  ac- 
count, the average variable cost of  producing 
cotton in  a particular- year. is 40 centslkg in the 
Aegean  region, and 39.2 centslkg in  the non- 
Aegean  region  (Ministry of  Agriculture  and 
Rural Affairs, 1998). These values include the 
unsubsidized  cost of  water,  but  include  only 
that  portion  of  fertilizer  costs  that  producers 
actually paid. The unsubsidized cost of fertil- 
izer equals 8.6 centslkg in the Aegean region 
and  8.2 centslkg  in  the  non-Aegean  region 
(Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural  Affairs, 
1998). However, producers in both regions re- 
ceive an input subsidy equal to 50 percent of 
the fertilizer cost. Hence, for the purposes of 
this  analysis,  the  unsubsidized  average  vari- 
able cost of producing cotton is 44.3 centslkg 
in the Aegean  market and 33.3 centslkg in the 
non-Aegean  market.  In addition, the unsubsi- 
dized average cost of water is 2.6 centslkg in 
the Aegean region and 5.2 centslkg in the non- 
Aegean region, where producers receive input 
subsidies  equal  to  50 percent  of  the  cost  of 
water in each ~iiarket.~ 
Due to data limitations the exact amount of 
credit  subsidies  received  by  Turkish  cotton 
producers is difficult  to approximate. For the 
purposes  of  this  analysis  it  is  assumed  that 
farmers can borrow  10  percent of the variable 
cost  of  cotton  production  at  a subsidized  in- 
terest rate of 50 percent per year, whereas the 
con~mercial  lending rate in Turkey  i\ approx- 
imately  100 percent  per  year  (Schmitz, Cak- 
mak, Schrnitz, and Gray, 1999). 
Effic.ic>r~cy  of' T~4rkislz  Corton Murkel t  in 
I Y 9-7/96 
For  this  section.  einpirical  estimates  are ob- 
tained  for  the  inefficiency  of  Turkish  cotton 
markets in  1995196. All  values are converted 
to  U.S  dollars  using  the  exchange  rate  for- 
1995l96. The Turkish government imposed an 
export tax of 20 centslkg on all exports of  Ae- 
gean cotton and applied an ad-valorem import 
tariff  of  1  percent  to the non-Aegean  market 
in  1995196. 
Table  1  shows the empirical results relating 
to the efficiency  of Turkish cotton markets  in 
1995196,  All  etnpirical  estimates  have  been 
-' It  is  not  possible  to  directly  calculate  consumer 
surplus under specification (I)  becauw it  involvcs di- 
viding  by  zero.  However.  it  is  possible  to cornputc 
changes in  consumer surplus as long as 8 is the same 
in both  calculatio~i\. 
These estimates are based on cost estimates of thc 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural  Affairs lor 1998. In 
proportional  and dollar  terms.  the  levcl  ol' water  and 
fertilizer subsidies did nor  change much over the livc- 
vear period from  1994 thro~lgh  1998. Table 1.  Efficiency of Turkish Cotton Markets in  199.5196 
Aegean Market  Non-Aegean Market  Total 
Free  Free 
Actual  Trade  Change  Actual  Trade  Change  Change 
World  Price (C/KG) 
Domestic Price (CIKG) 
Production (1000 MT) 
Consumption ( 1000 MT) 
Exports (1000 MT) 
Imports ( 1000 MT) 
Water Subsidies (mil $) 
Fertilizer Subsidies (mil $) 
Credit Subhidies (mil $) 
Export Tax  Revenue (mil $) 
Import Tariff Revenue ([nil $) 
Net  Govt. Payments (mil $) 
Market Revenue (mil $) 
Producer Surplus (mil $) 
Net  Producer Welfare (mil $) 
Consumer Surplus* (mil $) 
Total Turkish Welfare* (mil  $) 
;$  There  is  no closed-form  solution  fbr  con\umer surplus.  Hence, only changes  in  consumer surplus,  and  therefore 
chanfes  in total welfare. can be calculatcd. 
Notes:  Actual  199519h data on supply and dellland  were ohtained from  "Cotton:  Situation and E.;timatcs"  1997198 
and 1998190. AERI. Act~~al  yearly prices are simple averages of monthly prices. 
converted from a raw, seed basis to cotton lint. 
The actual levels of different variables that ex- 
isted  in  1995196 are  provided  in  the  second 
and fifth columns tsar the Aegean and non-Ae- 
gean markets. respectively. The simulation re- 
sults for the  levels that  would  have occurred 
under fi-ee trade in  1995196 are provided in the 
third  and  sixth  columns. The difference  be- 
tween the actual market and free trade are pro- 
vided  in  Columns 4 and 7. The aggregate re- 
sults  for  both  the  Aegean  and  non-Aegean 
markets are provided in Column 8 (Table  1). 
First,  consider  the  Aegean  market  (Col- 
umns 2 through 4). In the Aegean region, wa- 
ter subsidies in  1995196 were equal to $3.69 
million,  fertilizer  subsidies  were  equal  to 
$12.2 1  million  and credit subsidies amounted 
to $6.29 million. In  addition, the Turkish gov- 
ernment extracted export tax revenue equal to 
$1 1.60 mil lion. Exports were  1 3,990 MT low- 
er than they would have been under free trade, 
due in large part to the 20 centslkg export tax 
that existed during  1995196. Producer surplus 
was $35.05  million  lower than  it  would have 
been undel- free trade in  1995196. Even if  the 
$1 1.60 million  tax  revenue  was  distributed 
back to producers. net producer welfare would 
have still been  $23.45 million lower than  un- 
der  free  trade.  However,  consumers  gained 
$44.5 1  million  in  consumer  surplus because 
the  export tax  reduced  the price of domestic 
Aegean  cotton  compared  to  what  it  would 
have  been  under  free trade. The inefficiency 
of  the  Aegean  cotton  market  in  1995196, 
which represents the difference in total welfare 
between  the  actual  market  structure and  fi-ee 
trade, is estimated  at $1.14 million  as shown 
in the last row of Table  1. 
Now  consider  the  non-Aegean  market 
(Colu~nns  5 through 7). Net government pay- 
ments  (calculated as the sum of  water subsi- 
dies, fertilizer subsidies, and credit subsidies, 
minus  impost  tariff  revenue),  were  equal  to 
$46.99  million.  $1.77  million  was  collected 
from import duties on 1 14.000 MT of imports. 
Imports  of  non-Aegean  cotton  werc  17,030 8  X  JOLI~IZCII  of  Agri~~l~ltur~~l  und A[~p/ieti  Er~orlorrric..~.  April  2002 
MT lower than  they  would  have been  under 
free trade.  Producer  surplus was  $56.53 mil- 
lion higher than it would have been under free 
trade  in  1995196. If  the  $1 .77  million  tariff 
revenue was distributed buck to producers, net 
producer  welfare  was  $58.30  nlillion  higher 
than  it  would  have  been  under  free  trade. 
However.  consumers  lost  $10.34  million  in 
consurner surplus because the import tariff  in- 
serted a wedge between the domestic price and 
the  world  price. The inefficiency  of  the non- 
Aegean  cotton  market,  which  represents  the 
difference in  total  welfare  between the actual 
market structure and free trade, is estimated at 
$790,000 for 1995196. 
The last column in Table  1  shows the  ag- 
gregate welfare effects from both the Aegean 
and non-Aegean Turkish cotton markets. In to- 
tal,  producers  gained  $34.85  million  in  net 
producer welfare compared to free trade. Turk- 
ish consumers (i.e., cotton processors) gained 
$33.17 million  over free trade. However, the 
Turkish  government spent $17.99 million  on 
water  subsidies,  $34.76 nlillion  on fertilizer 
subsidies, and $18.20 n~illion  on credit subsi- 
dies. for a total of $70.95 million in input sub- 
sidies to support cotton producers. Combining 
the  producer,  consumer,  and  government  ef- 
fects.  the  net  inefficiency  of  Turkish  cotton 
markets  in  1995196 was  equal  to  $1.93  mil- 
lion. 
Ej$cirnc.y  of  T~4rki.sl1  Cotton  market.^  Under 
a  Large E.uport Tax trrrcl  Itrzport  TririJf 
In  1998, the Turkish  governmelit  imposed an 
ad-valorem import tariff  of 5.2 percent  in  the 
non-Aegean  import  market.  They  also  an- 
nounced  (but then  recanted) an export tax  of 
35 centslkg  that would  have been  applied  on 
all  Aegean  cotton  exports.  Although  the  35 
centslkg  export  tax  has  actually  been  with- 
drawn. it would have been of interest to obtain 
empirical  estimates  of  the  inefficiencies  that 
might  have  arisen  in  1998199 under  such  a 
support  mechanism. To  this  end, supply  and 
demand conditions for  1998199 are pro-jected 
as the three-year average of actual values frorn 
1995196-1 997198. The projected  world  price 
for  1998199  is  estimated  as  the  three-year 
weighted average of actual world  prices from 
1995196- 1997198. Water, fertilizel;  and credit 
subsidy  levels  are  assumed  to  remain  at  the 
levels used  to obtain the estimates in  Tablc  I. 
Table 2 shows the empirical results related 
to  the  efficiency  of  Turkish  cotton  markets 
projected for 1998199 under a 35 centslkg ex- 
port  tax  on Aegean  cotton  and a 5.2 percent 
ad-valorem import tariff  on non-Aegean cot- 
ton. In  the Aegean market, export tax revenue 
is prqjected  to be $14.12 million with an ad- 
ditional  $3.08  million  in  water  subsidies, 
$10.19  million  in  fertilizer  subsidies,  and 
$5.25 million  in  credit subsidies. Exports are 
projected  to  be  26.750  MT lower  than  they 
would  be  under free trade because of  the  35 
centslkg  export tax.  Producer surplus is pro- 
.jetted  to  be  $66.55  million  lower  than  it 
would be  under free trade in  199X199. On the 
other  hand.  consumers  are  projected  to  gain 
$66.73 million  in  consumer sul-plus because 
the export tax will reduce the pricc of domes- 
tic Aegean cotton compared to what it would 
be  under  free  trade.  The inefficiency  of  the 
Aegean  cotton  market.  which  represents  the 
difference in  total  welfare between the actual 
market structure and free trade, is projected to 
be $3.22 million dollars in  1998199. This val- 
ue  is almost  four times higher  than  the  inef- 
ficiency that  existed  in  1995196. 
In  the non-Aegean market, imports are pro- 
jected to be 30,460 MT lower than they would 
have been under free trade because of the 5.2 
percent  ad-valorem  tariff.  Net  government 
payments are pro.jectecl  to be $ I8 million high- 
er than under free trade; $2  I .95 million in  im- 
port tariff' revenue is pro-jected when compared 
to free trade. Producer surplus is projected to 
be $75.24 million higher than it would be un- 
der free trade in  1998199. If the $21.95 million 
tariff revenue is distributed back to producers. 
net producer wclfare is prqjected to be $97.19 
higher  than  under  free trade.  However, con- 
sumers are projected to lose $59.3  1  million in 
consumer  si~rplus  because  the  import  tariff 
will  raise  the  price  of  domestic  non-Aegean 
cotton  cornpared  to  what  it  would  be  under 
free trade. The inefficiency of the non-Aegean 
cotton market. which represents the difference 
in  total  welfare  between  the  actual  market Table 2.  Efficiency of Turkish Cotton Markets under a Large Export Tax and Import Tariff 
Aegean  Market  Non-Aegean Market  Total 
Free  Frcc 
Actual  Trade  Change  Actual  Trade  Change  Changc 
World  Price (CIKG) 
Domestic Price (CIKG) 
Production ( 1000 MT) 
Consunlption ( 1000 MT) 
Exports (1000 MT) 
Imports  (1  000 MT) 
Water  Subsidies (mil $) 
Fertilirer Subsidies (mil $) 
Credit Subsidies (mil J) 
Export Tax  Revenue (mil $) 
Import Tariff Revenue (mil $) 
Net  Govt. Payments (mil $) 
Markct  Rcvcnuc (mil $) 
Producer Surplus (mil $) 
Net  Producer Welfare (mil $) 
Consumer Surplus:" (mil $) 
Total  Turkish Welfrire'" (mil $) 
There  I\  no closed-form  solution  for consu~ncr  \urplu\.  Hence.  only changes  in  consumer  si~rpli~\,  and  therefore 
change\ in total weltare. can he calculated. 
Notes:  1008/c)~)  pro.jeclions  were  based  on s~~pply  ant1 demand data  li)r  1~~05/0h-1997/0X  obtained  from  "Cotton: 
Situation and Estimates"  19971OX  and 1908/99. AERI. World prices are calculated as the three-year weighted avcragc 
of world prices for 1995/06- 1997198. 
structure  and  free  trade,  is  projected  to  be 
$2.08 million. The degree of inefficiency pro- 
jected  for non-Aegean markets is almost three 
times higher than  in  1995196 (Table I). 
The last column in Table 2 shows the ag- 
gregate welfare effects projected  for both  the 
Aegean  and  non-Aegean Turkish  cotton  mar- 
kets under an export tax of 35 centslkg and an 
ad-valorem import tariff of 5.2 percent. In ag- 
gregate,  producers  are  prc?jected  to  gain 
$44.76 million  in  net  producer  welfare com- 
pared  to  free  trade.  Turkish  consuiners  (i.e., 
cotton processors) are projected  to gain $7.42 
million over free trade. However, it is project- 
ed  that  the  Turkish  government  will  spend 
$14.80 million on water subsidies, $28.67 mil- 
lion on fertilizer subsidies, and $15.0  l  million 
on credit  subsidies, for a total  of  $58.48 mil- 
lion in  input  subsidies to support cotton pro- 
ducers.  Combining  the  producer,  consumer. 
and  government  effects, the projected net  in- 
efficiency of Turkish cotton markets under an 
export tax of  35 ccnts/kg and an  import tariff 
of 5.2 percent is equal to $6.3 million. This is 
more than  three times  larger than  the net  in- 
efficiency  attributed to aggregate governnient 
support of  Turkish cotton producers  in  19951 
96.  However,  considering  that  the  total  reve- 
nue  received  by  producers  of  Turkish cotton 
in  the Aegean and  non-Aegean  markets com- 
bined  is  in  excess of one billion  dollars, the 
$6.3 million in inefficiency due to Turkish cot- 
ton  policy, even under a large export tax  and 
import tarif'f. is still less than  1 percent of total 
revenue. 
Conclusions and Other Considerations 
Cotton  producers  in  Turkey  receive  support 
from the government through  the  ASCUs  in 
the form of  water,  fertilizer, and credit subsi- 
dies. In  addition. export taxes in  the Aegean 
market  cause  significant  transfers  from  pro- 
ducers  to  taxpayers  and  consumers.  On  the 
other hand,  import  tariffs  in  the non-Aegean 90  Jocrrrltrl of Agriculturr~l  crnd  Al~plied  Ecorlotuic,.~,  April 2002 
market  cause  significant  transfers  from  both 
domestic and foreign consumers to producers. 
Results indicate that in  1995196, under a 20 
centslkg export tax  and  an  import tariff  of  1 
percent,  consumers  in  the  Aegean  market 
gained $44.5 rnillion, taxpayers lost $10.6 mil- 
lion. and producers lost $35.1 million. On the 
other  hand,  consumers  in  the  non-Aegean 
market lost $10.3  million. taxpayers lost  $47 
million, and producers  gained  $56.5 million. 
While these numbers provide evidence of sig- 
nificant income redistribution among the  var- 
ious sectors of  the Turkish  economy, the  net 
inefficiency  due to  government  distortions in 
1995196 was estimated  at only $1.14 million 
in  the  Aegean  market  and  $790,000  in  the 
non-Aegean  market. This amounts to  an  ag- 
gregate  inefficiency  of  only  $1.9 million 
caused by government intervention in Turkish 
cotton markets. Compared  to  the almost $1.4 
billion in market revenue, this deadweight loss 
amounts to only 0.14 percent of total revenue. 
The inefficiency of Turkish cotton markets 
was found to be small, even under a relatively 
large export tax of 35 centslkg and an import 
tariff  of  5.2 percent.  Under these conditions, 
consumers in  the  Aegean  market  gain  $66.7 
million, taxpayers lose $4.4 million, and pro- 
ducers lose  $52.4 million. Consumers in  the 
non-Aegean market lose $59.3, taxpayers lose 
$18 million, and producers gain $75.2 million. 
The net inefficiency  due to government  inter- 
vention under these conditions wo~ild  be $6.3 
million. While this  is  more  than  three times 
larger than  the  net inefficiency  in  1995196. it 
is still only 0.56 percent of total  revenue. 
These deadweight loss calculations are es- 
sentially  Harberger effects and do not  include 
inefficiencies  due to transaction costs associ- 
ated  with  policy  implementation.  In terms of 
measuring the efficiency of the Turkish cotton 
sector, there are additional considerations that 
are not accounted for in the empirical analysis. 
The implications of high inflation rates and ex- 
change rate fluctuations are not integrated into 
the analysis. In addition, the scope of the anal- 
ysis  is  limited  to the raw  cotton  sector,  and 
any  potential  market  power  is  not  explored. 
Further research could extend the analysis of 
cotton market efficiency  presented here to in- 
clude the implications of export taxes and im- 
port  duties  for both  the  production  and  pro- 
cessing  sectors  in  Turkey.  Elements  of  the 
Hudson and Etheridge (2000) approach could 
be  combined  with  the current analysis  to  ac- 
complish this goal. 
Discussions on privatization in  Turkey and 
other developing  countries  abound. Cotton  is 
one commodity for which privatization has oc- 
curred  rapidly.  Employment  in  TARIS  has 
dropped sharply, and elements of  a U.S. type 
of cooperative are emerging. Many of the AS- 
CUs are too  small  to be  efficient  and many 
will  likely  be  merged  in  the  future. TARIS 
also owns and operates a large yarn processing 
facility.  located  in  Izmir,  which  has  been  in 
operation  since  1980. It  is one of  the  largest 
yarn  processing  facilities in  the Middle  East. 
TARIS processes approximately 20 percent of 
its production  into yarn  and  sells the remain- 
ing 80 percent on the Izmir cotton exchange. 
The  government  is  considering  splitting  the 
procurement  and  processing  activities of  the 
ASCUs and  privatizing the processing plants. 
Privatization  would  obviously  affect  market 
inefficiency. If one foc~~ses  on the level of em- 
ployment involved with ASCUs such as TAR- 
IS, findings will most likely indicate that such 
ASCUs are technically inefficient.  largely be- 
cause of  over-employment  and  low  levels of 
technical and marketing skills. Future research 
i4 needed  to  determine whether  or not  there 
are  major  differences  between  the  technical 
and  economic  efficiency  of  private  firms  in 
Turkey  and their competitors. In  addition, the 
inefficiencies  generated  through  STEs  from 
rent-seeking behaviour  need to be explored. 
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Appendix I: Turkish Cotton Industry 
Cotton is produced  in  four main regions in  Turkey. 
Data on regional cotton production in Turkey from 
1987188 through  1997198 are provided in  Appendix 
Table  1. In  general, the  highest  quality  cotton  is 
grown in the Aegean region. TARIS operates main- 
ly  in  this  region,  which  is  the  largest  cotton-pro- 
ducing  region  in  Turkey.  From  I987188  through 
1997198. Turkey  produced  an  average of  656,000 
tonnes  of  lint,  with  the  Aegean  region  averaging 
275,000  tonncs.  Turkish  cotton  production  in- 
creased  significantly in  1995196 and  has  remained 
at a higher level than before  1995196. 
Cotton  produced  in  the  Aegean  region  of  Tur- 
key is roller-ginned as opposed to saw-ginned. For 
this reason, nearly all cotton processing facilities in 
the Aegean region can use only roller-ginned cotton 
in  their  production  process. Hence,  there  are  not 
many  substitutes  for cotton  inputs on  the  Aegean 
coast.  Egypt  is  the  only  country  that  produces  a 
close  substitute  for Turkish  Aegean  cotton.  How- 
ever, Turkey has more processing capacity than do- 
rnestic production can supply. These two facts con- 
tribute to Turkey's position as both an importer and 
exporter of  cotton. 
With  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  textile  and 
clothing  industry,  Turkey  has  become  a  net  im- 
Table Al. Cotton Lint Production in  Turkey 




Cuku-  An-  Ana- 
Year  rova  Aegean  talya  tolla  Total 
1987188  185  224  36  92  537 
1988189  196  305  42  107  650 
1989190  197  254  46  113  617 
1990191  190  285  38  142  655 
1991192  161  263  22  115  559 
1992193  194  260  26  95  575 
1993194  152  272  25  153  602 
1994195  178  265  20  164  627 
1995196  284  308  34  208  834 
1996197  225  278  32  226  761 
1997198  166  308  19  302  795 
Averilgc  193  275  31  156  656 
Source  Turk~\h  Cotton  Adv~\ory  Board  (Corre\pondence 
w~th  Tuldy Y~ld~r~m,  D~re~tor  ot the Agr~~ulturnl  E~onom- 
IL\ Re\earch Ins~~lute,  Ankdrd  T~~rhcy) Table A2.  Turkish Cotton  Con\umption,  Im- 
ports,  and  Exports  in  1000  Metric  Tonnes 
( 199019  1  through  1 996197) 
Con\ump- 
Year  tion  Imports  Exports 
1 09  019 1  557  48  I64 
I99 1/92  646  95  56 
1992193  676  236  58 
1993194  700  I21  109 
1 99419  5  850  239  2 
1995196  944  114  5  X 
I996197  99  I  77  45 
Average  766  133  70 
Source: Imports and  Export\ cotnpiled  from  Correapon- 
dence  with  Tulay  Yildirim. Cot>\umption data  are  I'r-om 
the  I!SDA  PS&D Electronic Database. 
porter of cotton during the Illst decade. Most of the 
imported cotton is comprised of low-cluality cotton 
lint  i~nported  from  the  Central  and  Eastern  Asian 
countries. Data on Turkish cotton consumption. irn- 
1-7(1rts,  and exports frclln  199019  1  through  I996197 
are  provided  in  Appendix  Table  2.  Cotton  con- 
sumption in Turkey has increased rapidly in  the last 
few years. Thi\ may  be  attributed  to the rapid  in- 
crease in processing capacity within Turkey. Turkey 
consurned  an  average of  766,000 tonncs  per  year 
of cotton from  199019  1  through  1996197. The vol- 
ume  of  Turkish  cotton  imports  has  typically  ex- 
ceedecl  the  volume of Turkish cotton  exports over 
the last several  years. On average, Turkey has im- 
ported  133.000  tonnes  per  year  while  exporting 
only 70,000 tonnes per year.  Hence, the volume of 
TL~-kish  imports is approximately twice as largc as 
the  volume of  Turkish  cotton  exports  in  a  typical 
year. 
Export taxes on cotton produced  in the Aegean 
region of Turkey scrve to reduce the internal price 
of  raw  Aegean cotton so that  domestic processors 
can purchase the rclw  product at a lower price. They 
also serve to increase  government I-evenue. These 
elements arc consistent with what Hudson and Eth- 
eridge (2000) tbund in Pakistan. On the other hand, 
import  tariffs  on nun-Aegean  cotton  serve to  in- 
crease  the  price  oT  non-Aegean  cotton  imports 
while sirnulta~ieo~~sly  allowing non-Aegean produc- 
ers to receive a higher price. Import tariffs on non- 
Aegean  cotton  also  serve to increase  government 
revenue  even  furthen  While  these  two  policies 
seem  inconsistent  with  each  other,  it  may  be the 
case that the import tariff is used to support farmers 
in  the  more rur:~l  and  poorer  non-Aegean areas of 
Table A3.  Purchases  and  Gross  Receipts  of 
Cotton by TARTS  (1 992193 through  1997198) 
Gross  Gross 
Receipts  Receipts 
Purchases  (Billions  (Millions 
(Metric  of 'Turkish  of U.S. 
Year  Tonnes)  Lira)  Dollars) 
1993194  25 1,238  1.818  89 
1994195  9 1,487  2,394  6 1 
1995196  159,383  7.067  112 
1996197  178,000  13,136  113 
I997/98  170, 137  24,905 
Average  170,049  9,864 
Source: Pel-sonill interview\ conducteil  with TARIS of'fi- 
ci;~ls.  Gross Receipts in  11.S. Dollars ;ire calculared using 
the August-July  avet-age  01'  nlonthly exchangc rates in the 
International Financial Statistics. [ME 
the country. while the export tax is used to support 
processors (the majority of whom are located in  the 
Aegean region). 
Appendix 11:  The TARIS Cooperative 
TARIS, ANTRIRLIK. atid  CUKOBTRLIK  are the 
three ASCU\ that are involved in cotton. These AS- 
CCJs are comprised of over  I  10 local cooperative.; 
which  have  a  con~bined  ~ncmbership  of  over 
140,000 producers. TARIS. ANTBIR1,IK.  and CU- 
KORRILIK  control  over 20 percent of  all  cotton 
marketed  in  Turkey.  TARIS.  established  in  the 
1950s, is a conglomer~tte  of Ibur unions of agricul- 
tural  cooperative societies. These unions specialize 
in  marketing cotton, olive oil, sultana raisins.  and 
figs. TARIS also markets several  by-products and 
derivatives of these four basic con~modities  includ- 
ing cotton yarn. gray knitted  fabric, lig paste, vin- 
egar. margarine, soap, and detergents. Membership 
in  TARIS is comprised of  13-5 cooperatives in  67 
locations serving  120,000 member growers. TARIS 
is also involved in extension activities, quality con- 
trol.  and product de\reloprnent efforts. 
The TARlS cotton  ~~nion  (TARIS PAMUK) is 
the largest in size when compared to the other three 
unions  that  comprise  TARIS.  The purchases  ancl 
gross  receipts of  cotton  hy  TARlS are  shown in 
Appendix Ethle 3. TARlS purchased an average of 
170,049  tonnes  of  cotton  per  year  frorii  1993194 
through  199719X. In  a typical year, TARlS controls 
in  the  neighborhood  of  10 percent  of  all  Turkish 
cotton  production.  The other coopel-atives have  a 
total of 5 perc,ent to 7 percent of the cotton ~ii;~rket. As a resulr, all of the cooperatives combined  havc 
roughly a 20 percent market share. While this mar- 
ket  share  seems relatively  low, TARlS controls a 
much larger share of the total  arnount of high q~~al- 
ity Aegean cotton sold domestically and for export. 
TARIS has a singlc agcnt  who sells colton  on 
the  I~mir  cotton  exchange on  behalf  of  its  mem- 
bers.  'l'llc  T~niir  cotton  exchange  is comprised  of 
buyers ancl  sellers from dolnestic and  international 
markets.  On Sune  22,  1998.  the  price  of  STD-  I 
SIRA cotton was 530.000 Turkish lira per kilogram. 
This colnpares to a New York  July fi~tures  price of 
435.490  T~~rkish  lira  per  kilograin.  The  price  dif- 
ference. according to the commodity exchange, can 
be attributed to a quality premium paid for Aegean 
cotton  and  an  aclditional  pre~nium  paid  for cotton 
sold by  TARIS. The quality premiums for Aegean 
cotton  in  general can  be  substantial ant1 vary con- 
siderably.  For  example,  the  price  correlation  be- 
tween  EGE STD-I  Izmir cotton and Memphis cot- 
ton for thc August to Ji~ly  1995/1996 crop year, as 
calculated in Izmir Ticaret Borsasi (IY97), was only 
0.3  1. 
Until the  1960s. TAKlS operated without direct 
financial 5LIpport fro111 the government. Each union 
offered  its  member-s :w  initial  payment, solcl  the 
procluct, and returned any final payment to its mem- 
bers on an annual basis. Sales were on a voluntary 
pooling  basis.  In  the  1960s.  the  cooperatives ex- 
perienced  financial  difficulties  and  turned  to  the 
government for financial  support. At that point the 
government became involved in price-selling actiu- 
ities and in the directorship of TARTS.  In ot-der to 
address the pooling problcm, cooperative n~enibers 
became  Icgolly  obligated  to  sell  their  product  to 
TARIS,  and  TARTS  became  legally  obligated  to 
buy  all of the product  offeretl fc~r  sale by  its niem- 
hers.  Not  long  after  the  government  became  in- 
volved. the setting of the initial price became both 
an income support mechanism for the government 
and a political  policy tool. A support price for the 
current year's crop was established by a corn~nittee 
con~prised  of  government  and  TARIS  officials. 
During this period the government retained any sur- 
pl~~se.;  in  the  pool  account, b~~t  also picked  up  any 
losses.  At  this  point  TARlS was no  longer tinan- 
cially accuuntable to its members. 
Even though the government relinquished direct 
control over setting initial prices in  1994, it did re- 
tain  indirect  influence  over  cotton  markets.  First, 
the general director of  TARIS is still appointed by 
the government, ancl hc or she has veto power over 
all  decisions  rnade  within  TARIS.  Second.  the 
unions  still receive  credit from the government in 
the form of low-interest  loans. Given the large sub- 
sidy  involved  in  these  loans,  the government can 
indirectly  influence  prices.  In  addition,  water  and 
fertilizer subsidies provided by the government are 
administcrcd through the ASCUs. 